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1. Introduction 
 
   Spontaneous order in economic interactions presented by Hayek (1948) is 
an important notion for economics. It, originates from the interactions of 
members of society, is something to which everyone contributes, from which 
everyone benefits, which everyone normally takes for granted, but which 
individuals rarely understand (Witt, 1997). Hayek believed that if the degree 
of freedom of a society, under the constraint of limited resources, reaches 
maximum, then a spontaneous order would emerge so that social members 
together occupy an optimal allocation of resources. Nevertheless, nobody 
makes clear what is the spontaneous order, for example, is it a natural law? On 
the other hand, we have known that in his early years Hayek focused his 
research on the theory of business cycle and later turned to the theory of a 
spontaneous economic order (Witt, 1997). Hence we want to ask a question: 
"Are there some relationships between economic crisis and spontaneous 
order?" Unfortunately, Hayek never reconsidered business cycle theory in the 
light of his later thought. 
   We are all now witnesses of the present huge financial crisis started in 
2008. As for this crisis, many people attribute the origin of it to the laissez 
faire policies supporting free markets (Bouchaud, 2008). Therefore, a natural 
question should be answered: "Is the spontaneous order really valid for free 
economies?" Regrettably, we can not answer this question because so far there 
is no a general equilibrium model which is really on the basis of the principle 
of spontaneous order1. For example, the standard model of modern economics 
is called Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) in which there is 
no an interesting variable corresponding to spontaneous order or degree of 
freedom of economic systems. Often, we do not find a strict solution to DSGE, 
but we can prove the existence of the equilibrium solution which has some 
fine properties such that economic crises are ruled out. This means, we can not 
                                                        
1 It is worth mentioning that there have been many literatures in which some authors try 
to connect the principle of spontaneous order and the method of evolutionary game, e.g., 
see Schotter (1981), Sugden (1989) and Young (1993) (1996). Nonetheless, these 
excellent attempts pay more attentions to the order of social rules (e.g., conventions or 
institutions) rather than the order of economic rules (e.g., distribution of wealth or 
income). Obviously, the imbalance of the latter is more likely associated with economic 
crises. And the latter which we are chiefly concerned with is easier to be tested 
empirically. 
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make clear the origin of economic crises only via the general equilibrium 
theory. As a result, some scholars appealed to abandon the DSGE and 
Neoclassical economics so as to develop some new economic theories of early 
warning of economic crises, see Hodgson (2009), Leijonhufvud (2009) and 
Farmer et al (2009). However, it is illogical to abandon Neoclassical 
economics, since it had obtained great success in the past. Later, we shall see 
that the spontaneous order is an inevitable outcome when multiple competitive 
equilibria arise, and that the economic crisis is an unstable state of 
spontaneous order.  
   As is well known, to guarantee that a competitive economy has a unique 
equilibrium outcome, we must assume that each consumer’s preferences are 
strictly convex (Jehle and Reny, 2001; Page 188) and meanwhile that each 
firm’s production possibility sets are strongly convex (Jehle and Reny, 2001; 
Page 206). Indeed, strict convexity of preferences is necessary (for 
Neoclassical economics), since it is exhibiting the principle of diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption (Jehle and Reny, 2001; Page 12). 
However, strong convexity will rule out constant returns to scale in production. 
And the latter is considerably important in the Neoclassical production theory. 
If, instead, merely convexity of production possibility sets is assumed, the 
existence of equilibrium outcome can still be proved (Debreu, 1971; Page 84). 
It is crucial that the convexity (rather than strong convexity) of production sets 
allows the possibility of constant returns to scale for firms (Jehle and Reny, 
2001; Page 216). So, if one notes that the constant returns technology is a 
(only sensible) long-run production technology (Varian, 1992; Page 356), the 
convexity of production possibility sets actually ensures the existence of 
long-run equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, if one notices that the long-run 
level of profits for a competitive firm that has constant returns to scale is a 
zero level of profits (Varian, 2003; Page 340), then one shall have to face an 
interesting (long-run) equilibrium state: each firm always gains zero economic 
profit no matter how it behaves. This strongly implies that the long-run 
competitive economy may have multiple or indeterminate equilibrium 
outcomes. 
   To strictly make clear whether or not a long-run competitive economy 
produces multiple equilibria, we need to introduce an exact definition for such 
an economy. In this paper, a long-run competitive economy would be specified 
by an Arrow-Debreu economy with additivity and publicly available 
technology. Traditional literature (Mas-Collel et al, 1995; Page 334) 
demonstrated that the long-run competitive economy is a situation of 
competitive economies when free entry is permitted. Roughly speaking, 
additivity means that there is free entry for firms into a possible industry 
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(Debreu, 1971; Page 41). Hence, additivity and publicly available technology 
would together guarantee that there is free entry for firms into any (technology) 
industry. Moreover, publicly available technology (Mas-Collel et al, 1995; 
Page 653) implies that firms produce their products with a similar or an 
identical technology; therefore, monopolistic competition and perfect 
competition are allowed for as well. Because of these above, we believe that 
an Arrow-Debreu economy with additivity and publicly available technology 
exactly describes the long-run competitive economy. Later, we shall prove that 
such an economy indeed has many (even infinitely many) equilibrium 
outcomes. Not only that, according to the first fundamental theorem of 
Welfare economics, these equilibrium outcomes should be all Pareto optimal. 
Because each equilibrium outcome is associated with a different social state, 
multiple equilibrium outcomes actually imply an uncertain economic world. 
To eliminate the uncertainty, welfare economists attempt to search the best 
outcome through an imaginary social welfare function. However, Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem had refuted this attempt (Jehle and Reny, 2001; Page 
243). This means, within the framework of Neoclassical and Welfare 
economics, a long-run competitive economy does produce an uncertain 
economic world.  
   In this paper, we propose a new scheme for “eliminating” the uncertainty. 
Our plan is to extend the theoretical framework of Neoclassical economics so 
as to exhibit the principle of spontaneous order, whence we shall find the 
economic rule hidden behind multiple equilibrium outcomes. The intuition 
behind our approach is as follows. Now that a long-run competitive economy 
produces multiple equilibrium outcomes, each of which is Pareto optimal. We 
can assume that all these outcomes (or corresponding social states) are equally 
likely to occur (or equivalently, to be selected with equal opportunities as 
collective decisions). Equal opportunities among equilibrium outcomes 
essentially imply an absolutely fair world in which there is no any difference 
between all the outcomes. Then, if we can find an economic order (or a 
convention) that contains the most equilibrium outcomes, it does occur with 
the highest probability (compared to other economic orders). We shall define 
such an economic order with the highest probability as the spontaneous 
economic order. Undoubtedly, such a definition exhibits Hayek’s core idea 
(Sugden, 1989): Spontaneous order is a convention which is most likely to 
evolve and survive.  
   To formalize the intuition above, we must first prove that a long-run 
competitive economy does produce a set of equilibrium outcomes, which is 
denoted, for example, by  4321 ,,, BBBBB  . Meanwhile we must show that 
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every element in the set B  is Pareto optimal. In this case, if the competitive 
economy is absolutely fair2, we can think of it as a fair procedure which would 
translate its fairness to the outcomes (Rawls, 1999; Page 75) so that all the 
social members would be indifferent between these elements; that is, 
   4321 ~~~ BBBB               (1.1) 
   Because all of these equilibrium outcomes are equally fair, every social 
member will have no desire of opposing or preferring a certain outcome. Then 
every equilibrium outcome should occur with an equal probability (or 
equivalently, every equilibrium outcome should be selected with an equal 
opportunity as collective decisions). For example, (1.1) implies that every 
equilibrium outcome iB  should occur with the probability 
4
1
, where, 
4,3,2,1i . Assume now that these four equilibrium outcomes could be divided 
into the following three economic orders3 (or three conventions):  11 Ba  , 
 322 , BBa   and  43 Ba  , then we have to conclude that 1a  occurs with 
the probability 
4
1
, and that 2a  occurs with the probability 
2
1
, and that 3a  
occurs with the probability 
4
1
. Undoubtedly, 2a  will occur with the highest 
probability, this is because 2a  contains the most equilibrium outcomes. 
Normally, more equilibrium outcomes imply more choice opportunities or 
greater opportunity-freedom, see Sen (1993). From this meaning, 2a  is an 
economic order not only with fairness but also with the greatest 
                                                        
2 It is worth mentioning that there might be difficulty concerning the possibility of 
satisfying fairness and Pareto optimality objectives simultaneously when interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are allowed (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1974). However, one can rule 
out this difficulty by insisting on the standpoint of ordinal utility (Pazner and Schmeidler, 
1978). 
3  11 Ba   represents an economic order or a convention that allows equilibrium 
outcome 
1B  to occur. Likewise,  322 , BBa   allows 2B  and 3B ;  43 Ba   allows 
4B . 
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opportunity-freedom. And 2a  is of course a spontaneous economic order 
according to previous definition.  
   Summarizing the analyses above, we are able to develop three steps for 
seeking the spontaneous economic order. First, try to find all possible 
equilibrium outcomes of a competitive economy. Second, divide all these 
equilibrium outcomes into some economic orders. Finally, find the economic 
order with the highest probability through the normative criteria about fairness 
and freedom.  
   The main purpose of this paper is to seek the spontaneous order of a 
long-run competitive economy using the three steps above. To arrive at this 
purpose, with each economic order we shall associate a possible individuals’ 
revenue distribution. With this setting, we later show that the spontaneous 
order of a monopolistic-competitive economy will obey a stable rule: 
Boltzmann distribution; and that the spontaneous order of a perfectly 
competitive economy will obey an unstable rule: Bose-Einstein distribution. 
And the instability of the latter might cause economic crises (Tao, 2010). 
Interestingly, some recent empirical investigations have confirmed that the 
individuals’ revenue distribution of free economies (e.g. USA) during the 
period of stable economy obeys Boltzmann distribution, see Yakovenko & 
Rosser (2009), Clementi, et al (2012); and obeys Bose-Einstein distribution in 
the run-up to an economic crisis, see Kürten & Kusmartsev (2011), 
Kusmartsev (2011). 
   Since our finding might appear somewhat surprising, we try to convey an 
intuition for the result. As is well known, in microeconomics, there are only 
four types of markets: perfectly competitive market, monopolistic-competitive 
market, oligopoly market and perfectly monopoly market. Also, for these four 
types of markets, the perfectly competitive market is of course most efficient. 
It is worth mentioning that, before every extremely serious economic crisis 
occurred, there always had, without exception, appeared the extremely 
prosperous economies, especially in financial market4. Therefore, a natural 
question arises: which type of the above four markets shall, most likely, cause 
the extremely prosperous economy?  
                                                        
4 Interestingly, compared to all the other real markets, the financial market is closest to a 
perfectly competitive market. This is the reason why the Black-Scholes equation of option 
pricing can be well applied in a financial market. The starting point of the Black-Scholes 
equation of option pricing is that the change in the price of stock obeys the law of 
Brownian movement. Only the perfectly competitive market, which is free of 
monopolization, is closest to such an ideal state. Minsky (1986) ever claimed that the 
finance was the cause of the instability of capitalism. Now, according to our theory, that is 
because the financial market is closest to perfect competition.   
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   Logically, the answer should be the most efficient market-namely, 
perfectly competitive market. 
   Let us recall that there was a common feature emerging in the past three 
serious economic crises 5 ; that is, before they occurred, there, without 
exception, had appeared the extremely prosperous economies. Of course, 
aimed at every past economic crisis, someone might always find an 
explanation which seems right for origin of this crisis, e.g. asymmetric 
information, currency mismatch between assets and liabilities of firms 
(Deesomsak et al, 2009), even greedy (selfish) for explaining the origin of 
economic crisis in 2008. However, we need to remind that the selfish is just 
one of several axioms of economics. We have known that perfect competition 
is the extreme case of competitive economies. Logically, as the competition in 
a free economy increases (for example, long-term policy of low rates of 
interest started in 2001 stimulated the competition in USA economy), the 
economy shall naturally evolve toward extreme competition (i.e., perfect 
competition) from monopolistic competition; however, according to our theory, 
perfect competition is not stable, and may cause economic crisis. That is to say, 
a thing turns into its opposite if pushed too far.  
   The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
definition of long-run competitive equilibrium within the framework of 
Arrow-Debreu economy. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 prove that a long-run 
competitive economy has at least an equilibrium outcome. Subsection 3.3 and 
section 4 show that a long-run equilibrium outcome might generate many 
(even infinite many) long-run equilibrium outcomes. Section 5 introduces the 
concepts of economic order and spontaneous economic order, and meanwhile 
shows that all the long-run equilibrium outcomes can be appropriately 
(non-repeated) assigned into some economic orders. Section 6 shows that one 
can seek the spontaneous economic order through some normative criteria 
about fairness and freedom. Section 7 investigates the possible link between 
spontaneous economic order and Neoclassical macroeconomics, and 
meanwhile introduces some empirical evidences supporting our results. 
Section 8 explores the relationship between technological progress and social 
freedom. In section 9, our conclusion follows. 
 
2. Preliminaries  
    
                                                        
5 These three economic crises are respectively: Great Depression in 1929, Asian financial 
crises in 1997, and American subprime crisis in 2008. 
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   We begin by describing a competitive economy which is composed of a 
vast number of agents (consumers and firms) and diverse industries. 
Following the standard framework of the Neoclassical economics (Mas-Collel 
et al, 1995; Page 579), we assume that there are M  consumers, N  firms 
and L  commodities. Every consumer Mi ,...,1  is specified by a 
consumption set L
i RX  , a preference relation 
i~
  on iX , an initial 
endowment vector Li R , and an ownership share 0ij  of each firm 
Nj ,...,1  (where 1
1


M
i
ij ). Each firm j  is characterized by a production 
set Lj RY  . All allocations for such an economy is a collection of 
consumption and production vectors: 
          NMNM YYXXyyxxyx  ......,...,,,...,, 1111 , 
   where  Liii xxx ,...,1  and  Ljjj yyy ,...,1 . 
 
2.1 Arrow-Debreu economy and competitive equilibrium            
 
   A well-known definition for competitive equilibrium is introduced as 
follow. 
 
Definition 2.1 (Mas-Collel et al, 1995; Page 579): An allocation     cc yx ,  
and a price vector  Lppp ,...,1  constitute a competitive (or Walrasian) 
equilibrium if the following three conditions are satisfied: 
   (1). Profit maximization: For every firm j , j
c
j Yy   maximizes profits in 
jY ; that is, 
   
c
jj ypyp   for all jj Yy    
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   (2). Utility maximization: For every consumer i , 
i
c
i Xx   is maximal for 
i~
  in the budget set: 
   






 

N
j
c
jijiiii yppxpXx
1
:  . 
   (3). Market clearing: 


N
j
c
j
M
i
i
M
i
c
i yx
111
 . 
 
   One can verify that the equilibrium allocation     cc yx ,  does exist if the 
following nine conditions are satisfied (Debreu, 1971; page 84). 
 
   For every consumer i : 
   (a). Each consumer's consumption set iX  is closed, convex, and bounded 
below; 
   (b). There is no satiation consumption bundle for any consumer; 
   (c). For each consumer Mi ,...,1 , the sets  '~ iiiii xxXx   and 
 i
i
iii xxXx
~
'   are closed; 
   (d). If 
1
ix  and 
2
ix  are two points of iX  and if t  is a real number in 
 1,0 , then 1
~
2
i
i
i xx   implies  
112 1 i
i
ii xxttx  ; 
   (e). There is 
0
ix  in iX , such that iix 
0 ; 
 
   For every firm j : 
  (f). jY0 ; 
   (g). 


N
j
jYY
1
 is closed and convex; 
   (h).  0 YY  ; 
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   (i). YRL   . 
 
   If a competitive economy satisfies (a)-(i), it is called the Arrow-Debreu 
economy (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). In particular, (d) will guarantee that each 
consumer’s preferences are strictly convex. It should be noted that Debreu did 
not emphasize the strict convexity of preferences. Instead, merely convexity of 
preferences was assumed in his famous book (Debreu, 1971; Page 84). 
However, strict convexity of preferences is necessary for Neoclassical 
economics, since it is exhibiting the principle of diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption (Jehle and Reny, 2001; Page 12). Technically, 
strict convexity of preferences will guarantee that  cMc xx ,...,1  is a unique 
equilibrium consumption allocation.  
   Here, we do not assume the strong convexity of production possibility sets, 
since it will rule out constant returns to scale in production (Jehle and Reny, 
2001; Page 206). Later, we shall see that constant returns technology is 
necessary when long-run competition is taken into account, and that (f)-(i) 
allow the possibility of constant returns to scale for firms. 
 
2.2 Long-run competitive equilibrium 
 
   Following Mas-Collel et al (1995; Page 334), we consider the case in 
which “an infinite number of firms can potentially be formed”; that is, 
N . Moreover, each firm has access to the publicly available technology 
so that it might enter and exit an industry in response to profit opportunities. 
“This scenario, known as a situation of free entry, is often a reasonable 
approximation when we think of long-run outcomes” in an industry (or a 
market). Under such a scenario, Mas-Collel et al deduced (1995; Page 335): 
“A firm will enter the market if it can earn positive profits at the going market 
price and will exit if it can make only negative profits at any positive 
production level given this price. If all firms, active and potential, take prices 
as unaffected by their own actions, this implies that active firms must earn 
exactly zero profits in any long-run competitive equilibrium; otherwise, we 
would have either no firms willing to be active in the market (if profits were 
negative) or an infinite number of firms entering the market (if profits were 
positive)”. From this reasoning, if all the industries (or markets) stay at 
long-run competitive equilibria, then we do have: 
   0 cjyp ,               (2.1) 
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   Nj , . . . ,1  
   Combining the Definition 2.1 and (2.1), we can present a natural definition 
for long-run competitive equilibrium as follow. 
 
Definition 2.2: An allocation     ** , yx  and a price vector  Lppp ,...,1  
constitute a long-run competitive equilibrium if the following three conditions 
are satisfied: 
   (1). For every firm j , there exists jj Yy 
*  such that 0*  jj ypyp  
for all jj Yy  .  
   (2). For every consumer i , ii Xx 
*  is maximal for 
i~
  in the budget set: 
    iiii pxpXx  : . 
   (3). 


N
j
j
M
i
i
M
i
i yx
1
*
11
*  . 
 
   Obviously, in contrast to the Definition 2.1, the Definition 2.2 has a 
stronger constraint; that is, the maximum profit of every firm j , 
*
jyp  , is 
restricted to be null. Because of this, we can not guarantee that     ** , yx  
does exist even if (a)-(i) are satisfied. In the next section, our attention will be 
focused on the existence of a long-run equilibrium allocation     ** , yx . To 
avoid confusion, when we mention an equilibrium allocation in the subsequent 
sections, we always mean that it denotes a long-run equilibrium allocation.  
 
3. Long-run competitive economy 
 
3.1 Assumptions 
    
   Now we explore what conditions will restrict the maximum profit of every 
firm j  to be null within the framework of Arrow-Debreu economy. 
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Assumption 3.1 (additivity): jjj YYY   for every j . 
   If the production set of the j th firm, jY , can be interpreted as an industry, 
the additivity Assumption 3.1 means that there is free entry for firms into that 
industry (Debreu, 1971; Page 41). More importantly, one has the result as 
below: 
 
Theorem 3.1: If Assumption 3.1 and (f) are satisfied, then the maximum profit 
of every firm j  is zero; that is, 0*  jyp  for Nj ,...,1 . 
   Proof. See page 45 in Debreu (1971). □ 
 
   The Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that the Arrow-Debreu economy under 
Assumption 3.1 will restrict the maximum profit of every firm to be null (if 
the maximum profit exists). Despite this, the additivity Assumption 3.1 does 
not really imply free entry, since jY  represents a private production set (of 
the j th firm) rather than a public industry. However, if the following 
assumption is satisfied, then the additivity Assumption 3.1 will imply free 
entry. 
 
Assumption 3.2 (publicly available technology6): NYYY  ...21 . 
 
   The Assumption 3.2 implies that every firm has free access to one 
another’s technology. Then every jY  represents a public production set, and 
thereby can be interpreted as a public (open) industry. Because of this, 
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 together imply free entry. More generally, we have: 
 
Proposition 3.1: Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 together guarantee that YYj   for 
Nj ,...,2,1  and thereby that YYY  , where 


N
j
jYY
1
. 
                                                        
6 Publicly available technology coincides with Rawls’ principle of fair equality of 
opportunity (Rawls, 1999; Page 63) 
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   Proof. To verify this proposition, we only need to prove that for any 
Yy  there has to be jYy . Because Yy , we have 


N
k
kyy
1
, where 
kk Yy  . Then, by Assumption 3.2, we immediately arrive at jk Yy   for 
Nk ,...2,1 , where Nj ,...,2,1 . Finally, by Assumption 3.1, we have 
j
N
k
k Yyy 
1
. □  
 
3.2 Existence of long-run competitive equilibrium 
 
   Because the Arrow-Debreu economy under Assumption 3.1 will restrict 
the maximum profit of every firm to be null (if the maximum profit exists), 
and also because Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 together imply free entry, whence 
we note that if the Arrow-Debreu economy under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 has 
an equilibrium allocation     '' , yx , then     '' , yx  will satisfy the Definition 
2.2 automatically. Therefore, we can introduce an exact definition for long-run 
competitive economy as follow. 
 
Definition 3.1: A competitive economy is a long-run competitive economy 
(LRCE) if and only if: 
(1). (a)-(i) are satisfied; 
(2). Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. 
 
   To verify that a LRCE has at least an equilibrium allocation, we only need 
to prove that (a)-(i) are compatible with Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. This is 
because (a)-(i) themselves would ensure the existence of an equilibrium 
allocation (Debreu,1971; page 84). Before proceeding to prove this, let us 
introduce two lemmas. 
 
Lemma 3.1: If (f)-(g) are satisfied and if Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold, then 
Y  is a cone with vertex 0, i.e., Yy  implies Yty  for any scalar 0t . 
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   Proof. First, by (f) one has Y0 , and by (g) Y  satisfies convexity; 
therefore, for any Yy  and any  1,0c , one has   Yccycy  01 . 
Second, by proposition 3.1 (because Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold) Y  
satisfies additivity; that is, for any non-negative integer k , one has Yky . 
Let t  be any non-negative number satisfying kt  , then the two 
preparations above imply Yky
k
t
ty  . □ 
 
   Recall that a cone with vertex 0 implies constant returns to scale 
(Debreu,1971; page 46), we immediately have two corollaries: 
 
Corollary 3.1: The production set Y  exhibits constant returns to scale. 
Corollary 3.2: The production set of each firm, jY , exhibits constant returns 
to scale. 
 
Lemma 3.2: If Y  is a cone with vertex 0 and meanwhile if Y  is closed and 
convex, then Y  must be a closed, convex cone with vertex 0. 
 
   Proof. See page 42 in Debreu (1971) □ 
 
   Combining the Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 we have: 
 
Theorem 3.2: A LRCE has at least an equilibrium allocation     ** , yx . 
 
   Proof. We now proceed to prove that (a)-(i) are compatible with 
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. By Lemma 3.1, (f)-(g) together with Assumptions 
3.1 and 3.2 guarantee that Y  is a cone with vertex 0. Then by (g) and Lemma 
3.2, Y  is further a closed, convex cone with vertex 0. Undoubtedly, such a 
result does not contradict (f)-(g). This means that (a)-(i) might be still satisfied 
even if Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. □ 
 
   Now that the LRCE satisfies (a)-(i) (see the proof above), we immediately 
arrive at two corollaries as follows: 
 
Corollary 3.3: The LRCE is an Arrow-Debreu economy. 
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Corollary 3.4: Any long-run equilibrium allocation     ** , yx  is a 
competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium. 
 
3.3 Multiplicity of long-run competitive equilibria 
 
   In subsection 3.2, we have proved that a LRCE has at least an equilibrium 
allocation       **1**1** ,...,,,...,, NM yyxxyx  . Next, we show that     ** , yx  
might generate many (even infinitely many) equilibrium allocations. 
   Let   


N
j
jypz
1
*  denote the aggregate production vector, then we have: 
 
Proposition 3.2:   jYpz   for Nj ,...,1 . 
 
   Proof. By Proposition 3.1 one has   jYYpz   for Nj ,...,1 . □ 
 
Lemma 3.3:   jYptz   for Nj ,...,1 , where 0t . 
 
   Proof. By Lemmas 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 one concludes   jYptz  . □  
 
Lemma 3.4:   0 pzp . 
 
   Proof. By Definition 2.2 one has 0*  jyp  for Nj ,...,1 . □ 
  
   Let us consider a sequence of numbers,  N
jj
t
1
, satisfying: 
   









1
, . . . ,2,10
1
N
j
j
j
t
Njf o rt
.             (3.1) 
   Then, by Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 we can prove the following proposition. 
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Proposition 3.3: Let 
      pztty jjj '               (3.2)  
   for Nj ,...,2,1 , then     NNM tytyxx '1'1**1 ,...,,,...,  constitutes a long-run 
equilibrium allocation. 
 
   Proof. Because     


n
j
j
N
j
jj ypzty
1
*
1
' , we only need to verify that each 
 
jj ty
'  satisfies the condition (1) in Definition 2.2. To this end, by Lemma 3.3 
  jjj Yty '  and by Lemma 3.4   0'  jj typ , where Nj ,...,1 . □ 
 
   The proof above implies two corollaries as below: 
 
Corollary 3.5:    pzty
N
j
jj 
1
' . 
Corollary 3.6:   0'  jj typ  for Nj ,...,1 . 
 
   The Proposition 3.3 indicates that each sequence  N
jj
t
1
 satisfying (3.1) 
will produce a different long-run equilibrium allocation correspondingly. 
Undoubtedly, there might be infinitely many possible sequences  N
jj
t
1
 
satisfying (3.1), so will be long-run equilibrium allocations.   
 
Lemma 3.5 (First fundamental theorem of Welfare economics): Any 
Walrasian equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. 
 
   Proof. See page 549 in Mas-Collel et al (1995). □ 
 
   Using Corollary 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 we can prove an important 
proposition. 
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Proposition 3.4: Any equilibrium allocation     NNM tytyxx '1'1**1 ,...,,,...,  
obeying (3.1) is Pareto optimal. 
 
   Proof. By Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 one concludes that any 
    NNM tytyxx '1'1**1 ,...,,,...,  obeying (3.1) is a Walrasian equilibrium. Then by 
Lemma 3.5 we complete this proof. □    
 
4. Uncertainty of social choice  
 
   The Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 together demonstrate that an equilibrium 
allocation  **1**1 ,...,,,..., NM yyxx  might generate uncertain equilibrium 
outcomes     NNM tytyxx '1'1**1 ,...,,,..., , each of which is Pareto optimal. And 
the following proposition will further reveal that the uncertainty of equilibrium 
outcomes is due to production side rather than consumption side. 
 
Proposition 4.1:  **2*1 ,...,, Mxxx  is a unique equilibrium consumption 
allocation. 
 
   Proof. If there were another equilibrium consumption allocation 
 ''2'1 ,...,, Mxxx  satisfying *
~
'
i
i
i xx   for Mi ,...,1 , then by the strict convexity 
condition (d) we do have   iiii Xxttxx 
*''' 1  so that 
*''
i
i
i xx   
contradicting the condition (2) of Definition 2.2, where 10  t . □       
 
   Obviously, using the Proposition 4.1 we immediately arrive at two 
corollaries: 
 
Corollary 4.1:     NNM tytyxx '1'1**1 ,...,,,...,  can be reduced to 
    NN tyty '1'1 ,..., . 
Corollary 4.2:  pz  is a fixed vector. 
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   Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 imply that all equilibria involve the same 
consumption vector, hence all consumers are indifferent between all equilibria 
and the multiplicity arises only from the distribution of production. Then a 
doubt might occur: Since the publicly available technology is assumed (see 
Assumption 3.2), the multiplicity is perhaps a meaningless (or spurious) 
multiplicity. However, the multiplicity of equilibria must be admitted, since 
the economic crises are just hidden in such a multiplicity. To see this, we 
consider a possible long-run equilibrium outcome   0,...,0,,,..., **1 pzxx M , 
where    pzty 1
'
1  and   0' jj ty  for Nj ,...,2 . This equilibrium itself 
strongly indicates an economic crisis: Only one firm survives, and others all 
go bankrupt since they stop production for a long time. Later we shall see that 
such an equilibrium involving economic crisis will not occur in a 
monopolistic-competitive economy7. Nevertheless, we can not rule out it in a 
perfectly competitive economy8. 
   Moreover, the Corollary 4.1 reminds us: To explore the uncertainty of 
equilibrium outcomes, we only need to analyze the equilibrium production 
allocation     NN tyty '1'1 ,..., . For convenience, we might as well denote by 
    NN tyty '1'1 ,...,  the long-run equilibrium allocation. 
 
4.1 Equilibrium revenue allocation 
 
   Without loss of generality, we assume that  pz  has at most one positive 
component (namely, a single output9). 
 
                                                        
7 (7.9) shows that firms’ revenue (or equivalently “output value” ) distribution in a 
monopolistic-competitive economy obeys the exponential law. Then there is no 
possibility that one firm’s output value is positive, and others’ all are null. 
8 (7.9) shows that firms’ revenue (or equivalently “output value” ) distribution in a 
perfectly competitive economy is unstable, since the denominator of (7.9) corresponding 
to 1I  may equal zero. Then there is indeed a possibility that one firm’s output value 
is positive, and others’ all are null. More details see Tao (2010).  
9 Indeed, the assumption about single output seems very restrictive; however, it made 
only to keep our writing to follow succinct. And this assumption will not affect the 
universality of our results.  
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Assumption 4.1: 
   
        
 
 






Lmmlpz
pz
pzpzpzpz
l
m
Lm
, . . . ,1,1, . . . ,1,0
0
, . . . ,, . . . ,1
,               (4.1) 
   where,  pzm  stands for outputs’ amount and  pzl  stands for inputs’ 
amount. 
 
   Substituting (4.1) into (3.2) we conclude that the equilibrium outputs’ 
amount of the j th firm is specified by  pzt mj . Because the equilibrium 
price of the m th commodity (i.e., output) is denoted by mp , whence the j th 
firm will obtain  pzpt mmj  units of revenue. 
   If we refer to  jj t  as the equilibrium revenue of the j th firm, and refer 
to   as the equilibrium total revenue of an economy, then we have:  
      pzptt mmjjj  ,                  (4.2) 
     

N
j
jj t
1
 .                      (4.3) 
   Substituting (4.2) into (4.3) we arrive at: 
    pzp mm .                      (4.4) 
   Using (4.4), (4.2) can be rewritten as: 
      jjj tt .                       (4.5) 
 
Definition 4.1: An equilibrium revenue allocation is a collection of firms’ 
revenue scalars: 
       NN tt  , . . . ,11 .                   (4.6) 
 
   Obviously, an equilibrium revenue allocation     NN tt  ,...,11  shows 
revenue allocations among N  firms when an economy arrives in long-run 
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competitive equilibria, so there is no essential distinction10 in denoting either 
by     NN tt  ,...,11  or by     NN tyty '1'1 ,...,  the long-run equilibrium 
allocation. In reality, however, compared to a production allocation 
    NN tyty '1'1 ,..., , a revenue allocation     NN tt  ,...,11  is often easier to be 
tested empirically. Because of this, we are more interested in exploring the 
revenue allocation of an economy. In the remainder of this paper, we always 
denote by     NN tt  ,...,11  the long-run equilibrium allocation (or 
equilibrium outcome). 
 
4.2 Uncertain equilibrium outcomes 
 
   Combining (3.1) and (4.5) one easily notes that any revenue allocation 
    NN tt  ,...,11  satisfying the following requirements: 
   
 
 









N
j
jj
jj
t
Njf o rt
1
,...,2,10


                   (4.7) 
   is a long-run equilibrium allocation. 
   Because of this, by Corollary 3.4 and Lemma 3.5, we immediately arrive 
at11: 
                                                        
10 Strictly speaking, with each equilibrium revenue allocation one might associate several 
or many equilibrium production allocations. For example, we can not eliminate a 
possibility that there were another equilibrium production allocation  aNa yy ,...,1  whose 
every vector a
jy  has two positive components: 
a
jy1  and 
a
jy2 , so that 
  a
j
a
jjj ypypt 2211   for Nj ,...,1 , where   


N
j
a
jypz
1
. Despite this,     NN tt  ,...,11  
is still an equilibrium allocation since  aNa yy ,...,1  is an equilibrium allocation. 
11 When we here say that an equilibrium revenue allocation is Pareto optimal, we actually 
mean that the corresponding equilibrium production allocation is Pareto optimal. In this 
case,     NN tt  ,...,11  corresponds to     NN tyty '1'1 ,...,  at least, see (3.2) and (4.2). 
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Corollary 4.3: Any revenue allocation     NN tt  ,...,11  satisfying (4.7) is 
Pareto optimal. 
 
   Undoubtedly, (4.7) implies that there are infinitely many possible 
equilibrium outcomes. We later show that each equilibrium outcome 
    NN tt  ,...,11  can be depicted as a visual figure. Temporarily, we will drop 
the constraint   

N
j
jj t
1
  in this subsection and the following two sections 
(concretely, subsection 4.2, sections 5 and subsections 6.1-6.2). However, we 
shall resume the constraint   

N
j
jj t
1
  starting from subsection 6.3. Such a 
treatment will help readers to follow our idea more easily. 
   We now consider a simple LRCE with two firms as below: 
 
Example 4.1: Assume that there exists a LRCE in which there are altogether 
two firms and two industries. Moreover, assume that if a firm enters the 
industry 1, then it will obtain 1  units of revenue; and that if a firm enters the 
industry 2, then it will obtain 2  units of revenue; and that 21   . 
 
   Let us then explore how many equilibrium outcomes the Example 4.1 has. 
Because there are altogether two firms, we need to count all possible revenue 
allocations     2211 , tt   satisfying (4.7). However, because the constraint 
  

2
1j
jj t  is temporarily dropped, we only need to count all possible 
revenue allocations     2211 , tt   satisfying   0jj t  for 2,1j . As a 
consequence, there are altogether four equilibrium outcomes, which are 
respectively as follows: 
    221 ,A ,  212 ,A ,  123 ,A ,  114 ,A . 
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                2       1       2      
                                   2 
        
                1                  
                                   1 
                            1A  
Figure 1: In the equilibrium outcome 1A , firms 1 and 2 both occupy the industry 2 and 
each obtains 2  units of revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
          2           2                     2          1 
                             2                                 2 
   
          1           1 1          2 
                             1                                 1 
                     2A                                 3A  
Figure 2: In the equilibrium outcome 2A , firm 1 occupies the industry 1 and obtains 1  
units of revenue; firm 2 occupies the industry 2 and obtains 
2  units of revenue. In the 
equilibrium outcome 3A , firm 1 occupies the industry 2 and obtains 2  units of 
revenue; firm 2 occupies the industry 1 and obtains 1  units of revenue. 
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                2             
                                   2 
        
                1        1       2  
                                   1 
                             4A  
Figure 3: In the equilibrium outcome 4A , firms 1 and 2 both occupy the industry 1 and 
each obtains 1  units of revenue. 
 
 
   If we denote a firm by a ball and denote an industry by a box, then each 
equilibrium outcome iA   4,3,2,1i  can be depicted as a visual figure, see 
Figures 1-3. For example, the Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium outcome 1A  in 
which firms 1 and 2 both occupy the industry 2 and each thereby obtains 2  
units of revenue, where ball 1 stands for firm 1 and box 1 stands for industry 1, 
and so forth. 
   Though the Example 4.1 merely describes a simple situation of (4.7) when 
2N  and  jj t  takes two possible values: 1  or 2 , there are still four 
equilibrium outcomes. And because each equilibrium outcome is Pareto 
optimal, we are not able to make clear which equilibrium outcome is best for 
society so that all the social members would like to choose it. Of course, 
welfare economists think that one can find the best equilibrium outcome by 
taking advantage of an imaginary social welfare function. Unfortunately, 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem has asserted that there is no such a social 
welfare function in the framework of ordinal utility (Jehle and Reny, 2001; 
Page 243). As a consequence, one would have to face an uncertain economic 
world which exhibits four possible social states12. However, this consequence 
                                                        
12 From the viewpoint of empirical observation, there must be one and only one 
equilibrium outcome (or social state) which would occur (at a given time) even if we 
don’t know which equilibrium outcome would occur. 
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seems to be inconsistent with the scientific spirit of economics which 
encourages the brave economists to explore the economic rule (or economic 
order) hidden behind the uncertain economic world. To proceed with this spirit, 
we attempt to extend the theoretical framework of Neoclassical economics by 
exhibiting Hayek’s principle of spontaneous order. To arrive at this purpose, 
we next introduce the concept of economic order.  
 
5. Economic order 
 
   To simplify the analysis, we begin to introduce the concept of economic 
order by investigating the four equilibrium outcomes of the Example 4.1. 
 
5.1. Definition  
 
   As pointed out in subsection 4.2, the LRCE described by Example 4.1 has 
four possible equilibrium outcomes: 1A , 2A , 3A  and 4A ; each of which can 
be associated with a figure. If one observes the Figures 1-3 carefully, then one 
might find that these four outcomes can be divided into three different groups. 
To see this, we consider an ordered pair  21,aa , where 1a  represents that 
there are 1a  firms each of which obtains 1  units of revenue, and 2a  
represents that there are 2a  firms each of which obtain 2  units of revenue. 
Adopting this notion one easily finds that the Figures 1-3 can be denoted by 
 2,0 21  aa ,  1,1 21  aa  and  0,2 21  aa  respectively.  
   It is here worth mentioning that even if the Figure 2 depicts two 
equilibrium outcomes (thereby two figures): 2A  and 3A , we can still use a 
unique ordered pair  1,1 21  aa  to denote it. This is because 2A  and 3A  
obey a unified rule or convention: One firm obtains 1  units of revenue and 
another obtains 
2  units of revenue. From this reasoning, an ordered pair 
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 21,aa  can be thought of as a ‘set’ whose elements are equilibrium outcomes. 
For example, 2A  and 3A  obey the rule  1,1 21  aa , so we get: 
      3221 ,1,1 AAaa  .                   (5.1)  
   Likewise, we have: 
      121 2,0 Aaa  .                     (5.2) 
      421 0,2 Aaa  .                     (5.3) 
   If we extend the analysis about two firms above to N  firms, then we 
have the following definition about economic order. 
 
Definition 5.1: Let W  denote the set of all possible equilibrium outcomes 
satisfying (4.7). A sequence of non-negative numbers,    n
n
kk
aaaa ,...,, 211  , 
is called an economic order if and only if it denotes a subset of W  obeying 
the following four conventions: 
(1). There are altogether n  possible revenue levels13: 
n  ...21 ; 
(2). There are ka  firms each of which obtains k  units of revenue, and k  
runs from 1 to n ; 
(3). These ka  firms are distributed among kg  industries
14; 
                                                        
13  To guarantee that all possible equilibrium outcomes satisfying (4.7) can be 
appropriately (and without loss of any outcomes) divided into those different economic 
orders fulfilling Definition 5.1, we might require that n  and 01  ll  , where 
1,...,2,1  nl .  
14 It is worth mentioning that we can not prevent the possibility that 1kg . To see this, 
suppose that there were an equilibrium production allocation which contains several 
different equilibrium production vectors each of which generates a same revenue level. 
These different equilibrium production vectors (which must be linearly independent and 
otherwise can be thought of an industry) can be thought of as different industries. In this 
sense, however, (3.2) implies 1kg  for nk ,...,2,1 . 
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(4). Na
n
k
k 
1
. 
 
   It is easy to see that with every economic order  n
kk
a
1
 one can associate 
a different revenue distribution as follow: There are 1a  firms each of which 
obtains 1  units of revenue, there are 2a  firms each of which obtain 2  
units of revenue, and so on. From this meaning, an economic order actually 
denotes an ordered distribution rule of society’s wealth. In general, any 
distribution rule is always due to some social institutions or conventions. In 
this sense, we are eager to make clear what distribution rule (or economic 
order) a free economy would obey. Hayek believed that if a competitive 
economy is enough fair and free, then a spontaneous economic order will arise. 
According to Hayek’s thought, a striking feature of the spontaneous economic 
order is that it is more likely to emerge or more able to survive than other 
economic orders (Sugden, 1989). With this thought, we can present a concrete 
definition for spontaneous economic order as below: 
 
Definition 5.2: For all possible economic orders  n
kk
a
1
 satisfying Definition 
5.1, if there exists an economic order  n
kk
a
1
*

 which would occur with the 
highest probability, then  n
kk
a
1
*

 is called a spontaneous economic order. 
 
   To understand the Definition 5.2, we can informally adopt the following 
statistical notion: One thinks of W  as a sample space in which each 
equilibrium outcome is regarded as a sample outcome (or an outcome of 
‘experiment’), and one thinks of an economic order as a random event which 
is identified with a collection of sample outcomes. Adopting such a notion, the 
spontaneous economic order is of course the most probable event (this is why 
it can arise spontaneously). In section 6, we shall formalize this notion and 
further show how to seek the spontaneous economic order from among all 
possible economic orders. 
   Before proceeding to do this, we are in particular interested in counting 
how many equilibrium outcomes a given economic order would contain. Let 
us next try to accomplish this task. 
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5.2. Monopolistic competition and perfect competition 
 
   For convenience, we here denote by15   n
kk
a
1
  the number of elements 
in a given economic order  n
kk
a
1
. Or equivalently we say that the economic 
order  n
kk
a
1
 contains   n
kk
a
1
  equilibrium outcomes. In microeconomics, 
we have made clear that there are two types of competitive structures, that is, 
perfect competition and monopolistic competition. Hence we need to find 
  n
kk
a
1
  in terms of these two types of economic structures respectively. 
 
Definition 5.3: Monopolistic-competitive economy is an Arrow-Debreu 
economy in which firms are completely distinguishable16 (or heterogeneous). 
 
   In fact, aimed at the LRCE described by Example 4.1, the Figures 1-3 have 
exhibited the situation of monopolistic competition where two balls (firms) are 
marked by serial numbers so that we can distinguish which is firm 1 and 
which is firm 2. For monopolistic-competitive LRCE, Tao (2010) has 
computed the number of elements in a given economic order  n
kk
a
1
 in the 
form: 
      
 



n
k
a
kn
k
k
m o n
n
kk
kg
a
N
a
1
1
1
!
!
.                (5.4) 
   For instance, the LRCE described by Example 4.1 requires that 2N , 
2n  and 121  gg . Thus, using the formula (5.4) we can compute the 
number of elements in each economic order as follows: 
      111
!2!0
!2
2,0 2021 


m o n
aa ,               (5.5) 
      211
!1!1
!2
1,1 1121 


m o n
aa ,                (5.6) 
                                                        
15 Adopting this notation,   n
kk
a
1
  should be a function of ka , where nk ,...,2,1 . 
16 Namely, that every firm corresponds to a different brand (Varian, 2003; Page 453) 
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      111
!0!2
!2
0,2 0221 


m o n
aa .               (5.7) 
 
   Clearly, the results (5.5)-(5.7) are consistent with the numbers of 
equilibrium outcomes listed by Figures 1-3 respectively. 
 
Definition 5.4: Perfectly competitive economy is an Arrow-Debreu economy 
in which firms are indistinguishable17 (or identical ). 
 
   To see the difference between perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition, we continue to concentrate on the LRCE described by Example 
4.1. Since firms are indistinguishable in perfectly competitive economy, we 
use the following three figures (see Figures 4-6) to list all possible equilibrium 
outcomes and the corresponding economic orders. 
   Typically, for the case of perfect competition, two balls (firms) are not 
marked by serial numbers (see Figures 4-6) so that we can not distinguish 
which is firm 1 or which is firm 2. Because of this, the economic order 
obeying perfect competition,  1,1 21  aa , contains only one equilibrium 
outcome, see Figure 5. This is clearly different from the case of monopolistic 
competition (comparing Figure 2 and Figure 5). 
   For perfectly competitive LRCE, Tao (2010) has computed the number of 
elements in a given economic order  n
kk
a
1
 in the form: 
       
  


n
k kk
kk
p e r
n
kk
ga
ga
a
1
1
!1!
!1
.                  (5.8) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 Namely, that firms produce homogeneous products (Varian, 2003; Page 380) so that 
the notion of brand does not exist. Perhaps, some people shall argue that homogeneous 
products, generally, only hold in one industry. However, in the long run, if a firm exits an 
industry, then it can enter an arbitrary industry in which there should not be differentiated 
products; otherwise there exists monopoly. As a result, homogeneous products, in the 
long run, hold in all industries; this case can be understood as products without brands (or 
equivalently, firms without brands). 
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                2            
                                   2 
        
                1                  
                                   1 
 
Figure 4: The economic order  2,0 21  aa  allows a single equilibrium outcome in 
which two indistinguishable firms occupy the industry 2 and each obtains 2  units of 
revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                2            
                                   2 
        
                1                  
                                   1 
 
Figure 5: The economic order  1,1 21  aa  allows a single equilibrium outcome in 
which one firm occupies the industry 1 (hence obtains 1  units of revenue) and another 
firm occupies the industry 2 (hence obtains 2  units of revenue). 
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                2            
                                   2 
        
                1                  
                                   1 
 
Figure 6: The economic order  0,2 21  aa  allows a single equilibrium outcome in 
which two indistinguishable firms occupy the industry 1 and each obtains 1  units of 
revenue. 
 
 
   Likewise, aimed at the LRCE described by Example 4.1, using the formula 
(5.8) we can compute the number of elements in each economic order as 
follows: 
     
 
 
 
 
1
!11!2
!112
!11!0
!110
2,0 21 






p e r
aa ,                 (5.9) 
     
 
 
 
 
1
!11!1
!111
!11!1
!111
1,1 21 






p e r
aa ,                  (5.10) 
     
 
 
 
 
1
!11!0
!110
!11!2
!112
0,2 21 






p e r
aa .                (5.11) 
   The results (5.9)-(5.11) are also consistent with the numbers of equilibrium 
outcomes listed by Figures 4-6 respectively. 
   In summary, we have: 
     
 
 
 
 
















 nc o m p e t i t i oicmonopolistg
a
N
ncompetitioperfect
ga
ga
a n
k
a
kn
k
k
n
k kk
kk
n
kk k
1
1
1
1
!
!
!1!
!1
.      (5.12) 
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6. Fairness, freedom and spontaneous economic order 
 
   In this section, we show how to seek the spontaneous economic order from 
among all possible economic orders by using the principles of fairness and 
freedom. 
 
6.1. Social fairness 
 
   Undoubtedly, an ideal framework of thinking about social fairness or 
equity is the theory of social choice. To keep the following analysis simple we 
proceed to investigate the Example 4.1. As mentioned in subsection 4.2, the 
Example 4.1 has four possible equilibrium outcomes: 1A , 2A , 3A  and 4A ; 
each of which is Pareto optimal. In this case, the task of the theory of social 
choice is to answer: Which of these four equilibrium outcomes is best for 
society. To accomplish this task, one may denote by  4321 ,,, AAAAA  the 
set of equilibrium outcomes. Then, if one can find some ranking of the 
equilibrium outcomes in A  that reflects ‘society’s’ preferences, one would 
determine the best social choice. Unfortunately, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 
has refuted the existence of such ‘society’s’ preferences (Jehle and Reny, 2001; 
Page 243). Hence one is not able to compare any two alternatives in A  from 
a point of view which is individually consistent and social consistent; 
otherwise, the social choice will be unfair. To ensure fairness, a wise treatment 
is to abandon comparing any two equilibrium outcomes in A , and meanwhile 
to admit equality between all these equilibrium outcomes; that is, 
   
4321 ~~~ AAAA ,              (6.1) 
   where, the symbol ~  stands for the indifference relation. 
   Obviously, such a treatment is exhibiting Leibniz's principle of the identity 
of indiscernibles (Arrow, 1963; Page 109). Now that social members are 
indifferent between all equilibrium outcomes, we can not ensure which 
outcome will be selected as a collective decision. This means that collective 
choices should be completely random. 
   Because of the randomness of the collective choices, we are very 
interested in exploring the probability that a certain equilibrium outcome will 
be selected as a collective decision in a just society. To this end, let us 
concentrate on Rawls’ pure procedural justice (Rawls, 1999; Page 74) which 
aims to design an economy (or economic institutions) so that the outcome is 
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just whatever it happens to be, at least so long as it is within a certain range. 
With this idea, a just economy can be regarded as a fair procedure which will 
translate its fairness to the (equilibrium) outcomes, so that every social 
member would have no desire of opposing or preferring a certain outcome. 
That is, (6.1) holds. Technically, to insure that the economy is one of pure 
procedural justice, Rawls suggested to take into account the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1999; Page 76). Following this principle, a fair 
economy implies that each outcome should be selected with equal 
opportunities18; in other words, then each outcome will occur with an equal 
probability. Based on the analyses above, we can present the following axiom 
for social fairness. 
 
Axiom 6.1: If a competitive economy produces   equilibrium outcomes, and 
if this economy is absolutely fair, then each equilibrium outcome will occur 
with an equal probability 

1
. 
 
   For instance, if the LRCE described by Example 4.1 is absolutely fair, then 
the Axiom 6.1 implies: 
         
4
1
4321  APAPAPAP ,                  (6.2) 
   where, we denote by  XP  the probability that an equilibrium outcome 
X  occurs. 
   Thanks to Axiom 6.1, we might apply the concept of classical probability 
(see page 21 in Larsen and Max (2001)) on the set of equilibrium outcomes of 
the LRCE. Concretely, we adopt the following three conventions: 
 
   (i). The set of all possible equilibrium outcomes satisfying (4.7), W  , is 
referred to as the sample space. 
   (ii). Each element (or equilibrium outcome) of the sample space W  is 
referred to as a sample outcome. 
   (iii). Each economic order which is identified with a collection of sample 
outcomes is referred to as a random event. 
 
                                                        
18 Following Rawls (1999; Page 134), fairness here has been modeled as a demand for 
insurance. For more investigations concentrating on the relationship between random 
choice and fairness, see Broome (1984).  
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   Clearly, adopting the conventions (i)-(iii), we are able to compute the 
probability that any economic order occurs, provided that all possible 
equilibrium outcomes had been found. For example,  
   by (6.2) and (5.1) one has 
            
2
1
,1,1 323221  APAPAAPaaP , 
   and by (6.2) and (5.2) one has        
4
1
2,0 1121  APAPaaP .      
 
6.2. Social freedom 
 
   The concept of freedom is very complex, and every attempt to formalize it 
must neglect important aspects (Puppe, 1996). As most authors have done 
(Sen, 1993) (Pattanaik and Xu, 1998), this paper concentrates on the 
opportunity aspect of freedom. In this case, if social members are indifferent 
between alternatives, then the extent of freedom offered to the social members 
is entirely determined by the size of the set of alternatives (i.e., opportunity 
set), see Sen (1993). 
   In subsection 5.2, we have known that a given economic order  n
kk
a
1
 
contains   n
kk
a
1
  equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, if an economy obeys 
the economic order  n
kk
a
1
, then the social members will face   n
kk
a
1
  
possible choices. In the spirit of the opportunity-freedom (Sen, 1993), one can 
refer to an economic order as an opportunity set. Thanks to that social 
members are indifferent between equilibrium outcomes (see subsection 6.1), 
then the degree of freedom of an economic order might be denoted by its size 
(i.e., number of elements in it). Thus, we have the following axiom: 
 
Axiom 6.2: If a competitive economy obeys an economic order  n
kk
a
1
 which 
contains   n
kk
a
1
  equilibrium outcomes, then the degree of freedom of this 
economy is denoted by   n
kk
a
1
 . 
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   Since valuing freedom of choice might involve psychology (Verme, 2009), 
we shall not discuss the relationship between freedom and preference19. Also, 
we must here emphasize that20 the degree of freedom defined by the Axiom 
6.2 has no any ethical standard about ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The larger degree of 
freedom merely implies the more possible choices. For example, by (5.1) the 
degree of freedom of  1,1 21  aa  equals 2, and by (5.2) the degree of 
freedom of  2,0 21  aa  equals 1. Then we do not mean that 
 1,1 21  aa  is better than  2,0 21  aa . 
   In subsection 5.1, we have defined the spontaneous economic order 
 n
kk
a
1
  as an economic order with the highest probability, sees Definition 5.2. 
Following this definition, we shall now show that if a competitive economy 
not only is absolutely fair but also has the largest degree of freedom, then it 
would obey the spontaneous economic order  n
kk
a
1
 . 
 
Lemma 6.1: If the competitive economy is absolutely fair, then the probability 
of the economic order  n
kk
a
1
 occurring is given by: 
        
  
 








n
kk
a
n
kk
n
kkn
kk
a
a
aP
1
'
1
'
1
1
,                      (6.3) 
   where,   
 




n
kk
a
n
kk
a
1
'
1
'  denotes the sum of the numbers of equilibrium 
outcomes over all possible economic orders. 
 
                                                        
19 However, some authors believe that judgments about the degree of freedom offered to 
an agent by different opportunity sets must take into account the agent’s preferences over 
alternatives, see Sen (1993), Kreps (1979) and Koopmans (1964). 
20 Sudgen (1998) also emphasized this point, and he further noted that the problem of 
measuring opportunity has many similarities with the familiar preference-aggregation 
problems of welfare economics and social choice theory. 
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   Proof. Because an economic order  n
kk
a
1
 contains   n
kk
a
1
  
equilibrium outcomes, one easily counts that the competitive economy 
produces   
 
 
'
1
'
ka
n
kk
a  equilibrium outcomes altogether. According to the 
Axiom 6.1, if the competitive economy is absolutely fair, then each 
equilibrium outcome will occur with an equal probability 
  
 




n
kk
a
n
kk
a
1
'
1
'
1
. 
Following the conventions (i)-(iii), the probability of the economic order 
 n
kk
a
1
 occurring is denoted by (6.3). □ 
 
   Using the Lemma 6.1, we can prove the following important result. 
 
Proposition 6.1: If a competitive economy is absolutely fair, and if it obeys 
the spontaneous economic order  n
kk
a
1
 , then it would have the largest degree 
of freedom; that is, 
     
 
  n
kk
a
n
kk
aa
n
kk
11
*
1
m a x



.                       (6.4) 
 
   Proof. According to the Definition 5.2, the spontaneous economic order 
 n
kk
a
1
  is the most probable economic order, so we have: 
     
 
  n
kk
a
n
kk
aPaP
n
kk
11
*
1
m a x


 .                   (6.5) 
   Substituting (6.3) into (6.5) yields (6.4). □ 
 
   The proof above implies a corollary as below: 
 
Corollary 6.1: If a competitive economy not only is absolutely fair but also 
has the largest degree of freedom, then it would obey a spontaneous economic 
order. 
 
   The Proposition 6.1 is a central result of this paper since it not only tells us 
that a spontaneous economic order is completely determined by fairness, 
freedom and competition, but also implies a method of seeking the 
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spontaneous economic order. It is easy to understand that seeking the 
spontaneous economic order  n
kk
a
1
  is equivalent to solving an extremum 
problem 
 
  n
kk
a
a
n
kk
1
1
max



. This is what we will accomplish in the next 
subsection. 
 
6.3. Spontaneous economic order    
 
   When we introduce the concept of economic order in section 5, we drop 
the constraint   

N
j
jj t
1
  in (4.7). Undoubtedly, such a treatment is not 
strict. To see this, let us now return to the Example 4.1. It is easy to see that if 
one assumes  21  , then one does have  11   and  22  . 
As a result, the economic orders  0,2 21  aa  and  2,0 21  aa  do not 
satisfy (4.7) so long as  21  . Consequently, to rule out the economic 
orders transgressing (4.7), we must resume the constraint   

N
j
jj t
1
 . 
Without loss of generality, all the economic orders obeying (4.7) must satisfy 
the following two constraints: 
   Na
n
k
k 
1
,                     (6.6) 
   

n
k
kka
1
 .                   (6.7) 
   It is easy to see that (6.7) is just the constraint   

N
j
jj t
1
 . Thus, 
seeking the spontaneous economic order  n
kk
a
1
  from among all the possible 
economic orders obeying (4.7) is equivalent to solving the extremum problem 
as below: 
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 
  


















n
k
kk
n
k
k
n
kk
a
a
aNts
a
n
kk
1
1
1
..
m a x
1

,                   (6.8) 
   where,   n
kk
a
1
  is denoted by (5.12). 
 
   To solve the extremum problem (6.8), we need to introduce a lemma. 
 
Lemma 6.2: Let     n
kk
aU
1
ln

 . If  U  reaches the maximum value 
at  n
kk
a
1
 , then   n
kk
a
1
  reaches the maximum value at  n
kk
a
1
  as well. 
 
   Proof. If one observes that  U  is a monotonically increasing function 
of   n
kk
a
1
 , then one easily completes the proof. □  
 
   Using the Lemma 6.2, the extremum problem (6.8) is equivalent to the 
following extremum problem: 
 
   
 
  


















n
k
kk
n
k
k
n
kk
a
a
aNts
a
n
kk
1
1
1
..
lnmax
1

.               (6.9) 
 
   Substituting (5.12) into (6.9) we obtain the spontaneous economic order of 
the LRCE in the form: 
    
Ie
g
Ia
k
k
k




  
 
 




ncompetitioicmonopolistI
ncompetitioperfectI
0
1
,     (6.10) 
   nk , . . . ,2,1  
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   where,   and   are Lagrange multipliers. Detailed calculations see 
Appendixes A and B. 
   The spontaneous economic order (6.10) is a central result of this paper; it 
is called the Bose-Einstein distribution whenever 1I , and is called the 
Boltzmann distribution whenever 0I  (Carter, 2001). Such an economic 
order determines the following rule of revenue distribution:  
   There are  Iak

 firms each of which obtains k  units of revenue, and 
k  runs from 1 to n .  
   Obviously,  0 Iak  will decrease exponentially as k  (or k ) grows. 
This result might strongly imply revenue inequality. However, revenue 
inequality does not contradict our definition for social fairness (see Axiom 6.1). 
In fact, Axiom 6.1 merely indicates that each firm has an equal chance of 
occupying any possible revenue level. In this case, to obtain a high revenue, 
luck and effort are likewise important, see Alesina and Angeletos (2005), 
Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012).      
   In addition,   and   in (6.10) are two indeterminate multipliers, and 
both can not be determined by the spontaneous order theory itself. 
 
7. Empirical investigation to spontaneous economic order 
 
   To make clear the economic meanings of   and  , we need to 
introduce the Neoclassical macroeconomics (Romer, 2000; Page 120) in 
which the aggregate revenue21   is completely determined by labor L , 
capital K  and technological progress T ; that is, 
    zyx TKL .                   (7.1) 
                                                        
21 Strictly speaking, we should here take the aggregate production function  pzm  
rather than the aggregate revenue function  , as introduced by Romer (2000). However, 
(4.4) implies that there is no essential difference between  pzm  and   (except a 
constant factor 
mp ). 
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   As is well known, an important role of firm is to collect labor and capital. 
Naturally, firm can be thought of being composed of labor and capital 
(Williamson and Winter, 1993), e.g. a unit of firm corresponds to a unit of 
labor and capital. Hence the total number of firms, N , can be written as a 
function with respect to labor L  and capital K ; that is, 
    yxKLNN  .                    (7.2) 
   Using (7.2), (7.1) can be rewritten in the form: 
    TN , .                    (7.3) 
   Complete differential of (7.3) yields:  
     dTdNTNd   , ,                      (7.4) 
   where, 
N

  and 
T

 .  
     and   denote the marginal labor-capital return and the marginal 
technology return of an economy respectively.  
   Using (6.6), (6.7) and (6.10), Tao (2010) arrived at: 
   
















 WW
WddNd
lnln
ln
1
,              (7.5) 
   where    


n
k
I
gk
kIeWW
1
1,
 . 
   Remarkably, the differential aggregate revenue (7.4) (from Neoclassical 
economics) and the differential aggregate revenue (7.5) (from spontaneous 
order theory) yield the same functional form. This means that Neoclassical 
economics and Austrian economics will be compatible with each other so long 
as (7.4) equals (7.5). 
   Following the thought of unifying Neoclassical and Austrian theories, by 
comparing (7.4) and (7.5), we get: 
   


  ,               (7.6) 
   


1
 ,                 (7.7) 
   















WW
WT
lnln
ln ,                  (7.8) 
   where   is a positive constant. 
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   Substituting (7.6) and (7.7) into (6.10) yields a definite form: 
    
Ie
g
Ia
k
k
k





  
 
 




ncompetitioicmonopolistI
ncompetitioperfectI
0
1
,         (7.9) 
   nk , . . . ,2,1 . 
   (7.9) has earlier been obtained by Tao (2010). It describes the firms’ 
revenue distribution in an economy. If we assign each firm to a different agent, 
then (7.9) may also describe the income distribution of a society. An attractive 
thought is to test (7.9) by collecting firms’ revenue data or individuals’ income 
data. Interestingly, there had been some empirical evidences supporting (7.9), 
see Yakovenko and Rosser (2009), Kürten and Kusmartsev (2011), 
Kusmartsev (2011), Clementi et al (2012). Let us next introduce how these 
empirical investigations support (7.9). 
   It is easy to see that   n
kk
Ia
1
0

   is an exponential distribution. Such a 
distribution is associated with the monopolistic-competitive economy. As 
pointed out in microeconomics, monopolistic competition is a common 
competitive mode, and most real economies usually obey this mode. 
Yakovenko and Rosser (2009) have confirmed that the income distribution in 
USA during from 1983 to 2000 well obeys the exponential distribution. Later, 
Clementi et al (2012) also confirmed this point. More concretely, Yakovenko 
and Rosser (2009) show that about 3% of the population obey Pareto 
distribution (i.e., power-law distribution), and 97% obey Boltzmann 
distribution (i.e., exponential distribution). This fact that income distribution 
consists of two distinct parts reveals the two-class structure of the American 
society22. 
   However,   n
kk
Ia
1
1

   is a unstable distribution. To see this, one only 
needs to notice that there may be a singularity  k  so that the 
denominator of (7.9) corresponding to 1I  equals zero. Because of this, 
there might be many and many firms (or agents) occupying a very low 
revenue level (or income level)  , details see the section IV in Tao (2010). 
                                                        
22 According to our theory, Boltzmann distribution is a consequence of free competition; 
hence, we infer that about 97% of the population in the American society obey the rule of 
free competition, but the remaining fraction might consist of monopolist (or privileged 
class). 
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Such a unstable distribution is associated with the case of extreme competition, 
i.e., perfect competition. Recently, Kürten and Kusmartsev (2011) have 
confirmed that the income distribution in USA between the years 1996-2008 
well obeys this distribution; also, that the financial crisis in 2008 is due to the 
instability of this distribution.  
    
8. Technological progress and freedom       
 
   In Neoclassical economics, the technological progress T  (sees (7.1)) is 
mysterious, and nobody makes clear what is the origin of it. Of course, there 
had been some excellent economic models, e.g. Romer (1990), in which the 
technological progress is interpreted as an endogenous variable, whereas it is 
artificially taken into these models. Remarkably, soon we shall see that if one 
treats Neoclassical economics and Austrian economics in a unified manner, 
one will decipher the profound origin of technological progress. 
   Using (5.12) and (6.10), Tao (2010) arrived at: 
     










WW
Wak
lnln
lnln * .              (8.1) 
   Substituting (8.1) into (7.8) yields a refined form23: 
    lnT .               (8.2) 
   From (8.2), we surprisingly find that the technological progress T  is 
exactly proportional to ln . Also, because   (or equivalently ln ) 
stands for the degree of freedom of an economy, whence we conclude: The 
more freedom, and the more rapid technological progress.  
   We try to convey an intuition for the result above. To make things simple 
we look at the Figures 1 and 2. The Figure 2 depicts the economic order 
 1,1 21  aa  whose degree of freedom is denoted by 2, then firm 1 not only 
may enter industry 1 but also may enter industry 2. By contrast, the degree of 
freedom of  2,0 21  aa  is denoted by 1, then firm 1 is confined within the 
industry 2 (see Figure 1). Logically, if a firm has the chance of entering two 
industries, then the probability of causing innovation should increase relative 
to only being confined within one industry. That is to say, the more freedom 
(namely, the larger  ), the larger probability of causing innovation. 
                                                        
23 (8.2) implies that technological progress T  looks like the entropy in physics (Tao, 
2010). Interestingly, the latter is often related to “information” or “knowledge”. 
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   As is well known, Schumpeter (1934) ever emphasized that innovation is a 
main driving force of promoting economic development. In the other direction, 
Hayek (1948) believed truly that freedom will induce a spontaneous economic 
order so that the economic development is most efficient. Interestingly, (8.2) 
undoubtedly indicates that the innovation emphasized by Schumpeter is 
essentially equivalent to the freedom highlighted by Hayek. In other words, 
our theory has unified the ideas of Schumpeter and Hayek which seem 
independent each other. From this meaning, when an economy favors a state 
with more freedom, it essentially favors a state (or evolutionary direction) with 
higher technology level as well. It is worth mentioning that the “freedom” is a 
natural endogenous variable in our theory24. To see this, substituting (8.2) into 
(7.3) we obtain: 
    

,N .            (8.3) 
   From (8.3), we see that the freedom ( ), as an equivalent replacement of 
technological progress (T ), will become a possible driving force of promoting 
economic growth. Actually, some empirical studies have found a non-linear 
relationship between economic freedom and growth, see Barro (1996). 
   So far, we have presented a complete theoretical framework for 
spontaneous economic order. At the moment, we need to review the logical 
setups of this theoretical framework. First, we prove that a LRCE does 
produce infinite many equilibrium outcomes. Second, we show that all these 
equilibrium outcomes can be appropriately (non-repeated) assigned into some 
economic orders. Third, according to the principles of fairness and freedom, 
one can determine an economic order which will occur with the highest 
probability, and we dub such an economic order the spontaneous economic 
order. Finally, we verify that Austrian economics and Neoclassical economics 
will become compatible with each other within the framework of spontaneous 
economic order, provided that the technological progress T  is proportional to 
the freedom variable ln . Because of these above, we believe that the 
spontaneous order theory presents a possible link between Austrian economics 
and Neoclassical economics.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
   This paper presents a theoretical framework for spontaneous economic 
order in which the union of Austrian economics and Neoclassical economics 
                                                        
24 Because of this, technological progress T  is also an endogenous variable. 
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lies at the heart of our attempt. Our study shows that if a competitive economy 
is enough fair and free, then an optimal economic order shall emerge 
spontaneously. It is worthwhile to note that such an economic order is not the 
result of any process of collective choice (unlike expected by many welfare 
economists), but is an unplanned and spontaneous consequence (as expected 
by Hayek). 
   Generally speaking, we can not guarantee that an Arrow-Debreu economy 
has only one equilibrium outcome. If an Arrow-Debreu economy (e.g., 
long-run competitive situation) produces multiple equilibrium outcomes, then 
according to the first fundamental theorem of Welfare economics each 
outcome will be Pareto optimal. Consequently, social members will have to 
face a problem of social choice: They must choose an equilibrium outcome 
which is best for society. For this problem, the proposal of welfare economists 
is to search the best outcome through an imaginary social welfare function. 
Nevertheless, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem warns us: There will be no such a 
social welfare function if we insist on the standpoint of ordinal utility. This 
means, a plan of seeking the best equilibrium outcome through an social 
welfare function is doomed to failure.  
   Our proposal here is to abandon searching the best equilibrium outcome 
and meanwhile to admit the equality between all possible equilibrium 
outcomes. In this case, we try to divide all these equilibrium outcomes into 
some groups each of which exhibits a different convention. These conventions 
are called the economic orders by us. Based on these preparations above, we 
show that if one adds some normative criteria about fairness and freedom into 
the Arrow-Debreu economy, one will find that there does exist an economic 
order with the highest probability which we call the spontaneous economic 
order. Undoubtedly, an economic order with the highest probability would 
most likely occur, this is why we call it the spontaneous order. In this sense, 
we can say that the economic world does change the way it does because it 
seeks an economic order of higher probability. Our attempt has very strong 
theoretical and practical significance: The goal of human society should be to 
insist on the criteria about fairness and freedom (similar to Axioms 6.1-6.2). 
Following these criteria, the competitive society will automatically obey a 
spontaneous economic order. Concretely, we conclude that the spontaneous 
order of a monopolistic-competitive economy will obey a stable rule: 
Boltzmann distribution; and that the spontaneous order of a perfectly 
competitive economy will obey an unstable rule: Bose-Einstein distribution. 
And the instability of the latter may cause economic crises. Our these 
conclusions have been supported by some recent empirical investigations.       
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   Obviously, our spontaneous order theory is in principle on the basis of the 
theoretical framework of Arrow-Debreu economy, so it may present a bridge 
linking Austrian economics and Neoclassical economics. An interesting 
conjecture is: Might Austrian economics and Neoclassical economics 
constitute a unified framework? Our spontaneous order theory confirms this 
conjecture, provided that the technological progress in Neoclassical economics 
and the “freedom” in Austrian economics become equivalent with each other. 
As an application of unifying these two types of economics, we shall 
comprehend a truth: "Freedom promotes technological progress."   
 
Appendixes 
 
A. Spontaneous economic order of perfectly competitive economy 
 
   Allow for that the number of firms N  in a long-run competitive 
economy, we assume that every ka  is a sufficiently large number. 
   If one considers the perfect competition, then using (5.12) the function 
 U  can be written in the form:  
        


n
k
k
n
k
k
n
k
kkp e r gagaU
111
!1ln!ln!1ln .         (A.1) 
   Thanks to that the values of ka  and kg  are large enough, using the 
Stirling's formula (Carter, 2001; Page 218) 
    1ln!ln  mmm ,    1m            (A.2) 
   (A.1) can be rewritten in the form: 
             


n
k
kkkkkkkkp e r ggaagagaU
1
1ln1ln1ln1 .      
(A.3) 
   The method of Lagrange multiplier for the optimal problem (6.9) gives 
   
  
0








kkk aa
N
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U
 ,    nk ,...,2,1            (A.4) 
   where,   and   are Lagrange multipliers.       
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Substituting (6.6), (6.7) and (A.3) into (A.4) yields 
0ln 







k
k
kk
a
ga
 ,                (A.5) 
nk ,...,2,1 . 
which is the spontaneous economic order of perfectly competitive 
economy: 
1

 ke
g
a kk  ,                 (A.6)   
nk ,...,2,1 . 
 
B. Spontaneous economic order of monopolistic-competitive economy 
 
   If one considers the monopolistic competition, then using (5.12) the 
function  U  can be written in the form:  
     

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!lnln!ln .               (B.1) 
   Using the Stirling's formula (A.2), (B.1) can be rewritten in the form: 
  

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   Substituting (6.6), (6.7) and (B.2) into (A.4) gives the spontaneous 
economic order of monopolistic-competitive economy: 
   
ke
g
a kk  ,                     (B.3) 
   nk , . . . ,2,1 . 
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